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Abstract We consider a general economy, where agents have private information
about their types. Types can be multidimensional and potentially interdependent. We
show that, if the realized frequency of types (the exact number of agents for each type)
is common knowledge, then a mechanism exists, which is consistent with truthful rev-
elation of private information and which implements first-best allocations of resources
as the unique equilibrium. The result requires the single-crossing property on utility
functions and the anonymity of the Pareto correspondence.
Keywords Adverse selection · First-best · Full implementation · Mechanism design ·
Single-crossing property
JEL Classification D71 · D82 · D86
1 Introduction
As first shown by Akerlof (1970), Spence (1973) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976),
hidden-type (adverse selection) problems can have significant consequences in terms
of efficiency on economic outcomes. More specifically, incentive compatibility con-
straints limit the set of feasible allocations that can be attained (see, e.g., Dréze et al.
2008). How are these restrictions relaxed as more information becomes common
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knowledge? And what is the minimum additional information required for achieving
first-best efficiency? These are some of the questions that have emerged in the attempt
to better understand the effects of information aggregation on efficiency. Indeed, some
early papers by McAfee (1992), Armstrong (1999) and Casella (2002) already point
toward this direction.
In this paper, we claim that if the number of agents with the same type is known for
all types in a population (in other words, the realized frequency of types is known), then
it is possible, under general conditions, to implement first-best allocations as a unique
equilibrium. More precisely, we consider an economy with asymmetric information,
where each agent has private information about his type. We also assume that: (i)
the realized frequency of types is common knowledge, (ii) preferences satisfy the
single-crossing property, and (iii) the social choice rule satisfies anonymity. Given
these conditions, we show that it is possible to construct a mechanism which has a
unique equilibrium, where all agents reveal their type truthfully and they receive a
first-best allocation.
The result is interesting because we examine an asymmetric information problem
which is situated in between the problem of Maskin (1999) (in which all agents know
the state of the world but the mechanism designer does not know it) and the classic
adverse selection (in which each agent knows only his own type and the mechanism
designer knows the ex ante distribution of types). The intuition behind the result is
that, if the realized frequency of types is known, then one can aggregate the messages
that all agents are sending out and uncover any misreport(s), even if the identity of the
liar is not known. That is, appropriately designed punishments for lying can induce
agents to reveal their information truthfully. We talk about appropriately designed
punishments, because one of the features of our mechanism is that punishments must
not be too harsh. If the punishment when a lie is detected is too severe, then some agents
may deliberately lie about their type in order to force other agents to also do so. The
lies cancel out at the aggregate level and the former agents “steal” the allocations of the
latter, who are forced to lie under the fear of the extreme punishments. This can lead
to coordination failures and multiplicity of equilibria. Therefore, uniqueness of the
equilibrium requires a careful construction of the off-the-equilibrium-path allocations
when lies are detected. We show that such punishments exist when the indifference
curves satisfy the single-crossing property.
Furthermore, our mechanism can be useful in addressing real-world problems
when agents’ individual characteristics (types) are privately known, but the central
authorities have good knowledge of the relevant aggregate numbers. For example, a
government may know the aggregate output (income) and the productivity in each sec-
tor but not the productivity of each individual agent. In such a case, the government
can employ our mechanism and taxes/subsidies to redistribute income without any
losses in terms of efficiency. Another example is the identification of the amount of
air pollution by each factory and the imposition of the corresponding penalty without
direct inspection. For this result, our mechanism requires knowledge of the aggregate
air pollution and the aggregate number of the machines used along with the machine
specifications determining the emission of air pollutants.
The most closely related paper to ours is Piketty (1993) which also assumes that the
realized distribution of types is common knowledge. Piketty considers the classical
123
Efficient allocations in economies with asymmetric…
taxation problem of Mirrlees (1971) and proposes a mechanism which allows the
government to implement any first-best efficient allocation. Our model differs from
Piketty in several respects: (i) Piketty considers only two private goods, while we
allow for any finite number of goods (some of which could be public). (ii) We consider
multidimensional asymmetric information instead of unidimensional. (iii) We allow
for a more general feasibility set.
Jackson and Sonnnenschein (2007) consider an economy where agents play mul-
tiple copies of the same game at the same time and their types are independently
distributed across games. They allow for mechanisms, which “budget” the number
of times that an agent claims to be of a certain type. If the number of parallel games
becomes very large, then all the Bayes-Nash equilibria of these mechanisms converge
to first-best allocations. Our model is different from theirs, because we do not require
multiple games to be played at the same time, but we impose a stronger assumption
on what is common knowledge.
Sun and Yannelis (2007a, 2008) show how incentive compatibility constraints
can be overcome and first-best achieved in economies with private information and
atomless agents. This efficiency result requires that the agents’ private signals be
conditionally independent (given the true state of nature) and utility functions and
endowments be type independent. Also, this result does not hold for economies with
asymmetric information and a fixed finite number of agents.
McLean and Postlewaite (2002, 2004) consider efficient mechanisms in economies
with interdependent values. The state of the world is unknown to all agents, but each
individual receives a noisy private signal about the state. They show that when sig-
nals are sufficiently correlated with the state of the world and each agent has small
informational size (in the sense that his signal does not contain additional information
about the state of the world when the signals of all the other agents are taken into
account), then their mechanism implements allocations arbitrarily close to first-best
allocations. However, in the model of McLean and Postlewaite, when private signals
are perfectly correlated, all agents learn not only their own type but also the type of
all other agents. That is, in the limit, the framework of McLean and Postlewaite is one
of complete information. In contrast, in our setting agents know, at most, the realized
frequency of types.1
VCG mechanisms (Vickrey 1961; Clarke 1971; Groves 1973) are often reference
points in terms of results on efficiency. With respect to these mechanisms, our paper
is more general as they assume quasi-linear preferences, while we allow for quasi-
concave utility functions. Moreover, these papers show that the respective mechanisms
that they examine produce truth-telling equilibria, but they do not examine whether
other equilibria, non-truth-telling, exist. In contrast, we consider this possibility and
show that the truth-telling equilibrium of our mechanism is unique.
Our paper is also related to the auctions literature with interdependent types. In
this context, Crémer and McLean (1985) and Perry and Reny (2002, 2005) show the
existence of efficient auctions when types are interdependent. Crémer and McLean,
however, require quasi-linear preferences, while we do not. Perry and Reny are closer to
1 In a sense, in our model agents receive private signals as well, but one can think of them as perfect signals
about the frequency of types.
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our result since they also assume that the single-crossing property holds. Nonetheless,
our main focus is the uniqueness of the equilibrium, an issue which, as with the VCG
literature, is not studied in these papers.
Rustichini et al. (1994) show that the inefficiency of trade between buyers and sellers
of a good, who are privately informed about their preferences, rapidly decreases with
the number of agents involved in the two sides of the market and in the limit it reaches
zero. Effectively, the paper examines the issue of convergence to the competitive
equilibrium as the number of agents increases. However, their model is limited to
private values problems and hence it can be seen as a special case of our formulation.
Following this direction of research, subsequent papers have examined the existence
and efficiency of equilibria in economies with asymmetric information when: (i) there
is a continuum of agents (Sun and Yannelis 2007b), (ii) there are infinitely many
commodities (Podczeck and Yannelis 2008), (iii) there is an infinite number of agents
and aggregate uncertainty (Qiao et al. 2016), (iv) there is a mix of “small” and “large”
agents (Pesce 2010), and (v) there are more private goods than states of nature (Correia-
da-Silva and Hervés-Beloso 2014). As in Rustichini et al. (1994), these papers restrict
their focus to satisfying incentive compatibility constraints, while we are interested in
full implementation.
More recently, the papers by Mezzetti (2004) and Ausubel (2004, 2006) examine the
issues of efficient implementation under interdependent valuations and independently
distributed types. However, they also assume that agents’ preferences are quasi-linear
with respect to the transfers they receive, whereas in our model utility may not be
transferable. Moreover, the mechanisms proposed in these papers may generate mul-
tiple equilibria (in most of which truth-telling is violated), while we are interested in
a mechanism which has a unique truth-telling equilibrium.
Finally, several recent papers examine efficient mechanism design in dynamic set-
tings. The most notable papers in this category are the papers by Battaglini (2005),
Athey and Segal (2007), Gershkov and Moldovanu (2009), Bergemann and Välimäki
(2010), Pavan et al. (2014), Athey and Segal (2013) and Escobar and Toikka (2013).
Our paper differs significantly from these papers. We assume that types are drawn only
once and the realized distribution of types becomes common knowledge subsequently,
while they assume that agents’ type evolves over time according to a stochastic process
which is common knowledge. On the other hand, we also use a multistage mecha-
nism in order to induce truthful reporting. As a result, even though agents’ private
information does not change in the various stages, their incentive to report truthfully
changes according to the information they learn from the previous stages, similarly to
the dynamic mechanism design literature.
2 An example: Spence (1973)
First we demonstrate how the knowledge of the realized frequency of types can be used
to implement first-best allocations as a unique equilibrium by applying the main idea
to the classic paper by Spence (1973). The economy consists of two types of workers.
Type 1 has low productivity a, and its proportion of the population is q1. Type 2 has
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Fig. 1 Application to Spence (1973)
high productivity a , (a > a), and its proportion of the population is 1−q1.
2 Acquiring
y units of education costs y/a for type 1 and y/a for type 2. Productivity parameters
are private information, and firms hire workers according to a wage schedule, based
on verifiable educational attainment. The payoff for an individual is the value of his
wage minus the educational cost and for a firm the productivity parameter minus the
wage.
Spence argues that agents will acquire education (which does not increase produc-
tivity in his model) in order to signal their productivity to firms. In equilibrium, the
wage schedules are such that high-productivity workers acquire some education and
credibly signal their type, while low-productivity workers acquire no education, and
firms correctly infer that they are of low productivity. The education acquired by type
2 is a deadweight loss, but necessary for credible signaling.
Assume that the total population is N . Then Nq1 is the total number of agents
of type 1, and N (1 − q1) is the total number of agents of type 2. Given this, the
following mechanism can separate types without any agent incurring educational costs
in equilibrium. Let all workers report their type. If the number of agents who report
type 1 and 2 is Nq1 and N (1−q1), respectively, then agents who report type 1 receive
wage w1 = a and zero education (contract α
F B
1 in Fig. 1) and those who report type 2
receive wage w2 = a and zero education (contract α
F B
2 in Fig. 1). In any other case,
where the reported number of types does not match their population size, those who
report type 1 receive w1 = a and those who report type 2, are asked to undertake one
unit of education and receive w2 = a + ǫ, with
1
a
< ǫ < 1
a
(recall that a unit of
education costs 1
a
for high-productivity workers and 1
a
for low-productivity workers).
2 Note that in the original paper, Spence made the assumption that a known proportion of the population
belongs to one type and the remainder proportion belongs to the other type. Hence, he implicitly made
the assumption that the realized frequency of types is common knowledge and, hence, we can apply our
mechanism directly into his economy.
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The above mechanism fully implements the first-best allocations in this economy.
First, consider the strategies of type 2. It is clear that, irrespective of the reports of the
other agents, it is a strictly dominant strategy for him to report his type truthfully. This
is because, when everybody else reports truthfully, type 2 prefers to report truthfully
as well (then his payoff is a) than to misreport his type (then his payoff is a), given that
a > a. Similarly, if someone else lies, type 2 prefers to report truthfully and receive
a payoff of a + ǫ − 1
a
than to cover the lie by misreporting and receive a, given that
a + ǫ − 1
a
> a. Given the dominant strategy of type 2 and a > a + ǫ − 1
a
, it is a
best-response for type 1 to report truthfully as well. Hence, all agents report truthfully
in equilibrium and acquire zero education. In Fig. 1, contract a0 denotes the offer to
the workers, who report high productivity, when lies are detected.
3 The economy and definitions
The previous example was used to show that it is possible to eliminate asymmetric
information problems if the realized frequency is common knowledge. We now pro-
ceed to show that this result is general and does not depend on the specifics of the
example. First, we introduce the economy and some useful definitions.
3.1 Agents, types and type profiles
The economy consists of a finite set N of agents. N stands for the aggregate number
of agents. Θ is the finite set of potential types with ϑ denoting a generic element
in the set. Θ denotes the aggregate number of types. In order to make our problem
non-trivial we assume that N ≥ 2 and Θ ≥ 2.ω ∈ ΘN is a type profile, i.e., a vector
which contains a draw of a type for each of the N agents in the economy. ω is drawn
from ΘN by a generic probability distribution f (ω), that is f : ΘN → ΔΘ
N
, where
ΔΘ
N
is the unit simplex over ΘN , i.e., { f ∈ R+|
∑
ω∈ΘN f (ω) = 1}.
3.2 Information structure and realized frequency of types
It is assumed that each agent has private information about his own type, but does
not know the types of the other agents, so that neither the agents nor the mecha-
nism designer knows the realized type profile ω. However, both the agents and the
mechanism designer know the realized frequency of types φ, where φ is a Θ-length
vector with each element φ(ϑ) denoting the proportion of agents who have type ϑ
in the realized type profile ω. That is, φ denotes the relative frequency of each type,
which materializes after types are drawn. Thus, N (ϑ) = φ(ϑ)N is the total number of
agents with type ϑ . Since there are several type profiles which have the same realized
frequency of types, let Ω(φ) denote the set of all type profiles consistent with φ.
3.3 Feasible allocations
Suppose that there are L goods in total in the economy which are distributed to and
consumed by the agents, with L ≥ 2. L denotes the set of goods. At least two of the
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goods in the economy are transferable and continuously divisible. If any of the goods
is non-transferable, then it is a public good, i.e., all agents consume the same quantity
of it.
An individual allocation ai is a L-length vector that specifies a quantity for each
good to be distributed to individual i . An allocation a is a L × N -length vector that
specifies an individual allocation for each agent.
Let A(N ,φ)be the set of all feasible allocations, with elements a ∈ A(φ) ⊆ RL×N+ .
Note that we allow the feasibility set to depend on φ but not on ω. That is, we implicitly
assume that whenever two type profiles imply the same frequency of realized types,
they also imply the same feasibility constraints. In other words, only the types of the
agents play a role in determining which allocations are feasible, not their identities.
For any subset of agents J, J ⊆ N , we also define A(J,φ) to be the set of feasible
allocations for the agents in J conditional on φ, that is A(J,φ) ⊆ RL×J+ .
Finally, note that later on in our analysis we focus on anonymous allocations that
is on allocations where agents of the same type receive the same bundle of goods.
Therefore, it is convenient to define individual allocations with respect to types rather
than with respect to the agents’ identities. To separate the two, we denote by aϑ the
type-specific individual allocation of an agent with type ϑ , which is interpreted as the
L-length vector of goods which the mechanism designer allocates to all agents of type
ϑ .
3.4 Utility functions and contour sets
u : RL × Θ → R is the Bernoulli utility, which is assumed to be continuous and
differentiable with respect to all the L arguments that represent goods. Hence, ui (ai ;ϑ)
denotes the utility of agent i from consuming individual allocation ai , conditional on
i’s type being ϑ . In the analysis that follows, however, we simplify the notation to
uϑ (aϑ ) so that only an agent’s type and her type-specific individual allocation show
up.
Furthermore, we assume that the utility functions for all types satisfy the single-
crossing condition. Formally, for any pair of types {ϑ, η} ∈ Θ, there exists at least
one pair of goods {k, l} ∈ L, such that −
∂uϑ/∂aϑl
∂uϑ/∂aϑk
< −
∂uη/∂aηl
∂uη/∂aηk
, where aϑk is the
individual allocation of good k to type ϑ . This condition is intuitive and is often used
in the mechanism design literature.
The following definitions of lower and upper contour sets are also useful. Lϑ (aϑ ) is
the lower contour set of an agent with type ϑ associated with a type-specific individual
allocation aϑ : Lϑ (aϑ ) = {c ∈ R
L
+ : uϑ (c) < uϑ (aϑ )}, and Vϑ (aϑ ) is the upper
contour set of type ϑ associated with aϑ : Vϑ (aϑ ) = {c ∈ R
L
+ : uϑ (c) > uϑ (aϑ )}.
3.5 Allocation rules, efficiency and anonymity
An allocation rule or social choice rule ρ is a mapping from the set of type profiles
consistent with φ to the set of feasible allocations, i.e., ρ : Ω(φ)→ A(N ,φ).
An allocation a is (Pareto) efficient or first-best if there does not exist any other
allocation b ∈ A(N ,φ) such that ui (b;ϑ) > ui (a;ϑ) for at least one agent i ∈ N
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and u j (b; η) ≥ u j (a; η) for all other agents j ∈ N \i . Similarly, an allocation rule ρ
is (Pareto) efficient or first-best if for every type profile ω ∈ Ω(φ) it implements
an efficient allocation a(ω). In order to differentiate efficient allocations (alloca-
tion rules) from non-efficient ones we denote them by a∗(ρ∗). Thus, the definition
of an efficient allocation rule can be formally expressed as ρ∗(ω) = a∗(ω), ∀
ω ∈ Ω(φ).
An allocation rule ρ is anonymous if, for every ω ∈ Ω(φ), agents with the same
type receive the same type-specific individual allocation. That is, every pair of agents
{i, j} ∈ N that share the same type ϑ receives the same type-specific individual
allocation aϑ . Thus, for allocation rules that satisfy anonymity, an agent’s identity per-
se has no impact on the agent’s final individual allocation. Anonymity is a desirable
property for a social choice rule. In most cases of interest, economists are concerned
with the economic characteristics of agents and not with their identity. Therefore,
it is reasonable to assume that, if the distribution of these characteristics remains
unchanged, so does the distribution of the economically desirable outcomes. It is also
a property satisfied by many commonly used social choice rules, like the Walrasian
correspondence and the utilitarian social welfare function.
Note that the definition of the allocation rule implies that anonymity is a property
of the final allocation as well. This means that if an allocation is anonymous, then all
agents with the same type receive the same individual allocation. A direct consequence
of this is that any anonymous allocation a can also be written as a Θ-length vector
of type-specific individual allocations aϑ . Thus, if an allocation a
∗ is both efficient
and anonymous, then it can be written as a Θ-length vector of first-best type-specific
individual allocations, denoted by a∗ϑ . Since our main results concern efficient and
anonymous allocation rules, the use of this notation is very convenient in simplifying
their presentation.
More importantly, if the allocations in a set {a(ω)} are anonymous and they share the
same realized distribution of types φ, then the set of type-specific individual allocations
{aϑ } for the respective types in Θ, as well the total number of bundles aϑ to be
distributed to the agents of each type, are fixed by φ and they are independent of ω.
This has important implications for the implementation of an efficient and anonymous
allocation rule ρ∗(ω). From the perspective of individual agents, each final allocation
a
∗(ω) is distinct from all the other because agents may receive different bundles to
consume depending on their type. But, viewed from the perspective of types, all a∗(ω)
contain the same type-specific individual allocations and in the same numbers, they
are just reshuffled across different agents. In other words, a mechanism designer who
is tasked with implementing an anonymous ρ∗(ω) with a fixed φ knows the number
of agents of each type, and the bundle of goods each type should consume, but does
not know who are the agents belonging to each type. Inducing agents to reveal this
information truthfully is the main objective of implementation.
3.6 Mechanisms, incentive compatibility and self-selective sets
A direct mechanism Ms(Js,ms, hs, gs) is a game form with a sequence s =
{1, 2, . . . , S} of stages, S < +∞.S denotes the set of all stages. Js is the set of
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agents participating at stage s.ms is a message profile , i.e., a report mis of her
type by every agent i in Js . The set of all possible message profiles at stage s
is Ms , while m−i,s denotes a type profile for all other agents apart from agent
i.hs : Ms → Js+1, Js+1 ⊆ Js , is a mapping from the set of message profiles to
the set of agents who continue to stage s + 1. gs : Ms → A(Js \ Js+1,φ) is a map-
ping from the set of message profiles to the set of allocations to the agents who exit
the mechanism at stage s. If Js+1 = Js , then gs = ∅.
A sequence of message profiles {m∗s |s ∈ S} constitutes a perfect Bayesian equi-
librium of the mechanism Ms if
∑
m
∗
−i,s
vis(m
∗
is,m
∗
−i,s)ds(m
∗
−i,s) ≥
∑
m
∗
−i,s
vis(mis,
m
∗
−i,s)ds(m
∗
−i,s),∀mis ∈ Mis,∀i ∈ Js, and∀ s ∈ S, where vis(ms) is the indirect
utility of agent i at stage s under the message profile ms , ds(m−i,s) is the probability
that all other agents than i play the message profile m−i,s , and Mis ⊆ Θ is agent’s i
message set at stage s.3 Similarly, a mechanism Ms is incentive compatible if, for every
agent i with type ϑ ,
∑
θ−i
vis(ϑ, θ−i )ds(θ−i ) ≥
∑
θ−i
vis(mis, θ−i )ds(θ−i ),∀ mis ∈
Mis, ∀i ∈ Js, and ∀s ∈ S, where θ−i is the type profile of all agents apart from i .
That is, a mechanism is incentive compatible when it is in the self-interest of every
agent to report her type truthfully, conditional on the other agents reporting their type
truthfully. Apart from the above common definitions, we also provide the following
definitions of self-selective type-specific individual allocation and self-selective set of
individual allocations, which are useful in proving our main result.
Given a set of types J ⊆ Θ, the set Aˆ of type-specific individual allocations is
a self-selective set of type-specific individual allocations or simply a self-selective
set, if the set contains as many type-specific individual allocations as the number of
types in the set J , and if, for each type ϑ ∈ J , there exists a type-specific individual
allocation aˆϑ ∈ Aˆ such that uϑ (aˆϑ ) > uϑ (aη), ∀ η ∈ J \ϑ . Any individual allocation
that belongs to a self-selective set Aˆ is called a self-selective type-specific individual
allocation. Simply put, the notion of self-selectiveness asserts that if a subset of types
were left to choose a single type-specific individual allocation from a self-selective
set, then each type would strictly prefer one of them over all other. This way agents
truthfully reveal their type through their choice. This is useful for us because we
use appropriately designed self-selective sets as out-of-equilibrium-path allocations
in order to ensure the incentive compatibility of our mechanism.
3.7 Remarks
Overall, the economy is described by the following primitives: E = {N ,Θ, A(N ,φ),
φ, u}. This modeling of the economy is very flexible and can be easily extended to
various dimensions. For example, the model allows for public goods problems, since
some elements of the individual allocations can be common. Also, since we impose
3 Therefore, for an agent i of type ϑ her indirect utility from stage s is vis (ms ) = ui (gs (ms );ϑ), if
i /∈ Js+1, and vis (ms ) = vi,s+1(ms+1), if i ∈ Js+1, where the latter case states that i’s payoff from stage
s is simply her continuation payoff. Also note that, from i’s perspective, the probability of the message
profile m−i,s is given by ds (m−i,s ) =
∏
j∈Js\i
∑
η∈Θ d js (m js , η) f j (η|φ, ϑ), where d js (m js , η) is the
probability that agent j plays m js conditional on her type being η and f j (η|φ, ϑ) is the probability that j
is of type η conditional on φ and on i’s type.
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no restrictions on φ or the type-generating process that produces φ, types may or
may not be independently distributed. Thus, several commonly used type-generating
processes, such as Markov chains, are compatible with our formulation.
Furthermore, the model can be easily extended to include inter-dependent valuations
for agents. For example, one may write the utility of agents as a function of both their
own type and the type of other agents, ui (ai ;ϑ, θ−i ). Or one may write the utility as a
function of the realized distribution of types, ui (ai ;ϑ,φ), if agents’ identities do not
play a role in other agents’ utilities. In either case, as long as the effect of θ−i and φ
on u is identical across agents of the same type, so that the notation uϑ (.) correctly
represents our model, all of the arguments and the results of the following section
follow.
Finally, our model can be extended to economies with uncertainty. For example,
let pi : φ → ΔZ be the probability distribution function over states, where Z the
finite set of states and ΔZ is the unit simplex {pi ∈ RZ+|
∑
z∈Z πz = 1}. In this case,
Y = Z × L , where L is the finite set of final goods and Y is the set of state-dependent
goods. Thus, for a ϑ-type agent, her expected utility function is given by uϑ (aϑ ;φ) =∑
z∈Z xϑ (aϑ , z)πz(φ), where xϑ (aϑ , z) is the decision-outcome payoff in state z.
This formulation allows one to introduce uncertainty into the primitives of the economy
while keeping the main framework unaffected, and thus our results apply equally well
to it.
4 Implementation of first-best allocations
The main result of the paper is that any anonymous efficient social choice rule ρ∗(ω)
can be uniquely implemented in perfect Bayesian equilibrium in a finite sequential
mechanism, i.e., for each ω ∈ Ω(φ), the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome
of the mechanism is ρ∗(ω) = a∗(ω).
In order to prove this result we proceed as follows. First, we show that Pareto
efficiency implies a ranking of types according to envy (Lemma 1). This property
is exploited in the design of the out-of-equilibrium-path allocations. Specifically,
we show that the combination of the single-crossing condition with the result of
Lemma 1 allows one to construct self-selective sets of type-specific individual allo-
cations (Lemma 2). Each set contains type-specific individual allocations which are
situated in the neighborhood of one of the first-best type-specific individual allocations
a
∗
ϑ constituting a
∗(ω). The self-selective sets designed according to Lemma 2 are used
as out-of-equilibrium-path allocations for each one of the stages of the mechanism.
Finally, we combine these two results to prove our main theorem on the implementation
of the efficient social choice rule. All proofs are provided in “Appendix.”
We start the analysis with the result that any Pareto efficient and anonymous allo-
cation a∗ implies a ranking of types according to envy.
Lemma 1 If a∗ is a Pareto efficient and anonymous allocation, then, for any Θˇ ⊆ Θ
and the corresponding set of type-specific individual allocations Aˇ = {a∗ϑ : ϑ ∈ Θˇ},
there exists at least one type ϑ ∈ Θˇ, who does not envy any of the other type-specific
individual allocations in Aˇ: uϑ (a
∗
ϑ ) ≥ uϑ (a
∗
η), ∀ a
∗
η ∈ Aˇ.
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Lemma 1 allows one to construct a complete ranking of types according to envy.
In particular, let K = {ϑ ∈ Θ : uϑ (a
∗
ϑ ) ≥ uη(a
∗
η), ∀η ∈ Θ} be the set of types who
do not envy the type-specific individual allocation of any other type. By Lemma 1,
we know that this set is non-empty. Then, by removing set K from the set of types Θ
and applying Lemma 1 again to the remaining set, one obtains the set K − 1 = {ϑ ∈
Θ : uϑ (a
∗
ϑ ) ≥ uη(a
∗
η), ∀η ∈ Θ−K}. By iteration, one may define a total number of
K envy sets, {K,K − 1,K − 2, . . . , 1}, 1 ≤ K ≤ Θ , ranked according to envy from
the “highest” envy set K to the “lowest” set 1, such that the types in each one of them
(say envy set K − k) do not envy any of the types in their own set or lower sets (any
K − l, with l ≥ k), but they envy some type(s) in a higher set (some type in an envy
set K − l, l < k).4
The K envy sets defined above could be used to construct a mechanism which
induces all types to reveal their type truthfully. However, such a mechanism would
involve tedious case distinctions across envy sets. In order to simplify the required
mechanism we rank types within each envy set that contains multiple types so that the
mechanism is implemented over a full ranking of types. This can be achieved because
the way these envy sets are constructed ensures that there is no envy between types
which belong to the same envy set. For the rest of the analysis we assume that the
mechanism designer ranks types according to the following simple rules:
1. Types who belong to a higher envy set are ranked above types who belong to a
lower envy set.
2. If two types, ϑ and η, belong to the same envy set and uϑ (a
∗
ϑ ) > uϑ (a
∗
η),
uη(a
∗
η) = uη(a
∗
ϑ ), then type ϑ receives higher ranking than type η.
3. If two types, ϑ and η, belong to the same envy set and uϑ (a
∗
ϑ ) > uϑ (a
∗
η),
uη(a
∗
η) > uη(a
∗
ϑ ), then the ranking between the two types is arbitrarily deter-
mined as long as it is compatible with rules 1 and 2 above whenever comparing
the rank of types ϑ and η with the rest of the types.
Two notes are worth making at this point. First, in order for the ranking of types to be
complete, one should also examine the case where ϑ and η belong to the same envy
set and uϑ (a
∗
ϑ ) = uϑ (a
∗
η), uη(a
∗
η) = uη(a
∗
ϑ ). However, this case is incompatible with
single-crossing and so it is impossible to occur. Second, the ranking of types implied
by rule 2 satisfies transitivity; hence, it is consistent.5
Overall, by following the above rules, the mechanism designer ranks all types
according to envy from the type with the lowest rank, type 1, to the type with the
highest rank, type Θ . From this point forward we use ϑ to denote the rank of a type,
so that 1 ≤ ϑ ≤ Θ . By the construction of this ranking, type Θ does not envy the
first-best type-specific individual allocation of any other type. A generic type ϑ may
envy the first-best type-specific individual allocation of a higher type (κ > ϑ), but
4 One extreme case is when an allocation exhibits no envy, in which case the set K contains the whole set
of types and the total number of envy sets is only one (egalitarian allocations: K = 1). The other extreme
case is when each envy set contains a single type, in which case the types form a complete hierarchy, from
the one who is envied by all the other types to the one who is not envied by anyone and the total number of
envy sets is equal to the total number of types (K = Θ).
5 The proof of this claim is provided in Appendix under Lemma 3. We are grateful to one anonymous
referee for pointing it out to us.
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does not envy the first-best type-specific individual allocation of any type with lower
rank (η < ϑ).6
The next step is to exploit the ranking of types and the single-crossing property to
construct self-selective sets of type-specific individual allocations in the neighborhood
of every first-best type-specific individual allocation contained in any a∗(ω). These
self-selective sets are used as out-of-equilibrium-path allocations in the mechanism,
and they serve the purpose of “punishments” for misreporting types. To be more
precise, given a complete ranking of types created by applying the rules above, for each
type ϑ with respective first-best type-specific individual allocation a∗ϑ , we construct a
self-selective set of type-specific individual allocations Aˆ(a∗ϑ ) such that (i) it contains
a
∗
ϑ , and (ii) it contains a self-selective type-specific individual allocation for every type
which has higher rank than typeϑ in an ǫ-neighborhood of a∗ϑ , where ǫ is an arbitrarily
small positive number. This means that any type with rank higher than ϑ prefers one
of the type-specific individual allocations in Aˆ(a∗ϑ ) over all others. Lemma 2 below
proves that the single-crossing condition allows one to construct self-selective sets
with the above properties in the neighborhood of any a∗ϑ .
Lemma 2 Suppose that the single-crossing condition on utility functions holds
and consider a first-best allocation a∗(ω) with type-specific individual allocations
a
∗
ϑ , ∀ ϑ ∈ Θ and a complete ranking of types according to envy from the type with
the lowest rank, type 1, to the type with the highest rank, type Θ . Then, for every
a
∗
ϑ ∈ a
∗(ω), 1 ≤ ϑ ≤ Θ − 1, there exists ǫ > 0 small enough and a set of
self-selective type-specific individual allocations Aˆ(a∗ϑ ) such that:
(i) a∗ϑ ∈ Aˆ(a
∗
ϑ )
(ii) there exists aˆη ∈ Aˆ(a
∗
ϑ ) such that: uη(aˆη) > uη(aˆζ ), ∀ aˆζ ∈ Aˆ(a
∗
ϑ ),
aˆζ = aˆη, ∀ η : ϑ ≤ η ≤ Θ
(iii) ‖a∗ϑ − aˆη‖ ≤ ǫ, ∀ aˆη ∈ Aˆ(a
∗
ϑ )
(iv) uη(a
∗
η) > uη(aˆη), ∀ η : ϑ < η ≤ Θ
Recall from Sect. 3 that the set of first-best type-specific individual allocations, a∗ϑ ,
contained in a∗(ω) is the same across all ω ∈ Ω(φ). Therefore, any self-selective set
with the properties of Lemma 2 is independent of ω, i.e., it retains its properties across
all ω ∈ Ω(φ).
The results in Lemmas 1 and 2 are useful in designing a sequential mechanism which
implements the first-best allocation rule as a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The
proof of this result is provided in “Appendix.” Here, we provide a verbal presentation
of the mechanism and a sketch of the arguments used in the proof.
The mechanism consists of Θ − 1 stages, one less than the total number of types,
which is Θ . Each stage is designed so as to incentivize the agents of a particular type
(the “target” type) to report truthfully their type, receive the respective first-best type-
specific individual allocation for this type, and exit the mechanism. The first stage of
the mechanism is designed for type 1, and each successive stage is designed for the
6 Note that the ranking of types depends implicitly on the allocation rule ρ∗. But since the set of type-
specific individual allocations {a∗
ϑ
} to be implemented by ρ∗ does not depend on ω, the ranking of types is
fixed for all ω ∈ Ω(φ) as well.
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type with rank one level higher than the type of the previous stage. The final stage,
stage Θ − 1, is designed for the two types with the highest rank, types Θ − 1 and Θ .
In particular, at each stage, all agents who participate in it are asked to report their
type. If the number of reports for the “target” type equals the realized number of
agents with this type (which is known through φ), then the agents who report this type
receive the respective first-best type-specific individual allocation of this type and exit
the mechanism, while the agents, who report any other type, move to the next stage.
If, on the other hand, the number of reports for the “target” type does not equal the
realized number of agents with this type, then the mechanism terminates at this stage
and all agents receive the self-selective type-specific individual allocation of the type
they reported in that stage (i.e., their last report) from a set which has the properties of
Lemma 2. Finally, if the mechanism does not terminate in any of the previous stages,
the last stage of the mechanism is stage Θ − 1.
The main reason that the above mechanism works is because, at each stage, types
of higher rank than the “target” type strictly prefer to report truthfully their type
than to report the “target” type, irrespective of the reports of the rest of the agents. In
particular, if they expect the mechanism to end at the current stage, they prefer to report
truthfully, and thus pick their most preferred type-specific individual allocation from
the corresponding self-selective set triggered by the mechanism’s termination, than to
report any other type. And if they expect that the mechanism will not terminate at the
current stage, then they prefer not to report the “target” type, because the continuation
payoff from the mechanism is higher than exiting with the type-specific individual
allocation of the “target” type. The last point holds because types of higher rank do
not envy the “target” type’s first-best type-specific individual allocation. Since higher
rank types do not report this type, the best-response of agents of the “target” type is
to report truthfully and by induction the result obtains.
Before the presentation of the theorem, a couple of remarks are noteworthy. First,
the sequential nature of the mechanism used in the proof is not a necessary element of
the result, i.e., one can find equivalent static mechanisms that implement the efficient
allocation rule as a unique Bayesian equilibrium. Even though static mechanisms are
less notation-heavy, they involve more case distinctions than our sequential mecha-
nism, which makes the proof longer and more tedious. For the sake of elegance and
transparency we opt for the sequential mechanism presented in detail in “Appendix.”
Second, we remark again that, because a∗(ω) is anonymous and φ is common
knowledge, the first-best type-specific individual allocations {a∗ϑ } and the total number
of bundles for each type are the same for every a∗(ω). It is only the identity of the
agents who belong in each type that it is not known across each ω ∈ Ω(φ). Therefore,
a mechanism implements ρ∗(ω) if it induces agents to report their type truthfully and
if it allocates to them the respective first-best type-specific individual allocation of the
type they report.
Theorem 1 If the realized distribution of types is common knowledge and preferences
satisfy the single-crossing condition, then there exists a mechanism which imple-
ments any Pareto efficient and anonymous allocation rule ρ∗(ω) as the unique perfect
Bayesian equilibrium. In this equilibrium each agent reports her private information
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truthfully and receives the first-best type-specific individual allocation corresponding
to her type.
Before concluding, we would like to briefly comment on the advantages our mecha-
nism presents in comparison with the existing literature on implementation (see, e.g.,
Jackson (1991), Maskin (1999). First, our mechanism holds even with two agents (or
even in the degenerate case of one agent). Second, the required message space is min-
imal, since agents send messages only about their own type. Third, we do not require
any ad hoc game, which has no equilibrium in pure strategies (like an integer game),
in order to rule out undesirable equilibria. This is achieved by “enticing” some of the
misreporting agents to report truthfully, whenever there are multiple misrepresenta-
tions. Finally, even though the domain of preferences we consider is strictly smaller
than in many other papers, still our assumptions on utility functions are relatively weak
and there are many cases of interest that comply with them.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we consider a general hidden-type economy and, under relatively weak
conditions, we show that it is possible to construct a mechanism which has a unique
perfect Bayesian equilibrium, where all agents reveal their type truthfully and they
receive a first-best individual allocation. If the realized frequencies of types are known,
then one can aggregate the messages that all agents send and uncover any misreport(s),
even if the identity of the liar is not known.
Truth-telling, however, requires appropriately designed punishments for lying. If
the punishment from detecting a lie is too severe, then some agents may deliberately
lie about their type in order to force other agents to also do so. The lies cancel out
and the former agents “steal” the individual allocations of the latter, who are forced to
lie under the fear of extreme punishments. This can lead to coordination failures and
multiplicity of equilibria. Therefore, uniqueness of the equilibrium requires a careful
construction of the individual allocations when lies are detected. We show that such
punishments exist when the single-crossing condition holds.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
First note that, by the assumptions made on the nature of the goods in this economy
(i.e., either transferable private goods or public goods), it is possible to reallocate
individual allocations from one agent to another. For example, it is possible for the
mechanism designer to take a type-specific individual allocation aϑ from agent i of
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type ϑ and give it to agent j of type η, while j’s type-specific allocation aη may be
reallocated to agent h and so on.
Then, consider a Pareto efficient and anonymous allocation a∗ with type-specific
individual allocations a∗ϑ and suppose that Lemma 1 does not hold for some subset
Θˇ of types, Θˇ ⊆ Θ, with corresponding set of type-specific individual allocations
Aˇ = {a∗ϑ | ∀ ϑ ∈ Θˇ}. This means that all types in Θˇ envy the type-specific individual
allocation of at least one other type: ∀ a∗ϑ ∈ Aˇ, ∃ η ∈ Θˇ, η = ϑ : uϑ (a
∗
η) > uϑ (a
∗
ϑ ).
But, since this holds for all types, then there exists at least one reassignment of the
type-specific individual allocations among the agents with types in Θˇ such that some
of them are made strictly better-off and the rest remain as well-off as under the original
allocation a∗.
For example, one could create a reassignment cycle by taking one agent from an
arbitrary type, reassign to her one of the type-specific individual allocations that she
envies, then proceed to the agent from whom the type-specific individual allocation
was taken from, reassign to her one of the type-specific individual allocations that she
envies, and so on, until the cycle returns back to one of the agents whose type-specific
individual allocation has been reassigned. Because the set of agents is finite such a
cycle is guaranteed to exist. Agents not involved in the cycle retain the type-specific
individual allocations under a∗.
However, the existence of such a cycle constitutes a Pareto improvement for a subset
of agents in N and violates the initial assumption that a∗ is Pareto efficient. ⊓⊔
Proof of Lemma 2
The proof is done by the construction of a self-selective set that satisfies the properties
of Lemma 2 with respect to an arbitrary type ϑ . For this purpose recall the definitions
of upper contour set and lower contour set from Sect. 3, and consider a first-best and
anonymous allocation a∗(ω) and the corresponding first-best type-specific individual
allocations a∗ϑ , for anyϑ ∈ Θ. We use the single-crossing condition of utility functions
and the complete ranking of types according to envy, which is possible as a result
of Lemma 1 and which is assumed to satisfy the ranking rules 1–3 of page 10, to
construct the required self-selective set. To show that this is possible, we take a type
of an arbitrary rank ϑ , 1 ≤ ϑ ≤ Θ and consider the following algorithm for picking
a sequence of type-specific individual allocations aˆη to be the elements of the self-
selective set Aˆ(a∗ϑ ).
First, take a∗ϑ itself to be the first element of the set. Then use a
∗
ϑ as a starting
point and pass the indifference curves of types ϑ and ϑ + 1 from this point. By the
single-crossing condition, the set Vϑ+1(a
∗
ϑ ) ∩ Lϑ (a
∗
ϑ ) is non-empty. For some ǫ > 0
to be defined precisely later in the analysis, pick a type-specific individual allocation
aˆϑ+1 in the set Vϑ+1(a
∗
ϑ )∩ Lϑ (a
∗
ϑ ), such that ‖a
∗
ϑ − aˆϑ+1‖ ≤
ǫ
Θ−ϑ , to be the second
element in Aˆ(a∗ϑ ). In the last expression, Θ − ϑ is the natural number that represents
the difference between the ranks of the type with the highest rank, Θ , with the rank of
type ϑ . Also, because the utility functions are assumed to be continuous with respect
to goods, it is always possible to find aˆϑ+1 in the set Vϑ+1(a
∗
ϑ ) ∩ Lϑ (a
∗
ϑ ) such that
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‖a∗ϑ − aˆϑ+1‖ ≤
ǫ
Θ−ϑ for any ǫ > 0. Finally, note that, by construction, type ϑ strictly
prefers a∗ϑ to aˆϑ+1, while type ϑ + 1 strictly prefers aˆϑ+1 to a
∗
ϑ .
With aˆϑ+1 as a new starting point, reiterate the above procedure for types ϑ + 1
and ϑ + 2 to pick aˆϑ+2 in the intersection of the lower contour sets of types ϑ and
ϑ + 1 with the upper contour sets of types ϑ + 1 and ϑ + 2,
[
Vϑ+1(a
∗
ϑ ) ∩ Lϑ (a
∗
ϑ )
]
∩[
Vϑ+2(aˆϑ+1) ∩ Lϑ+1(aˆϑ+1)
]
, such that ‖aˆϑ+1 − aˆϑ+2‖ ≤
ǫ
Θ−ϑ . Again, because
of the continuity of the utility functions, the intersection Vϑ+1(a
∗
ϑ ) ∩ Lϑ (a
∗
ϑ ) ∩
Vϑ+2(aˆϑ+1) ∩ Lϑ+1(aˆϑ+1) is non-empty and a type-specific individual allocation
aˆϑ+2 satisfying the above conditions exists. Note that, because aˆϑ+2 ∈ Lϑ+1(aˆϑ+1)
and aˆϑ+1 ∈ Lϑ (a
∗
ϑ ), then aˆϑ+2 ∈ Lϑ (a
∗
ϑ ), so ϑ strictly prefers a
∗
ϑ to aˆϑ+2. Similarly,
aˆϑ+2 ∈ Vϑ+2(aˆϑ ), so ϑ + 2 strictly prefers aˆϑ+2 to a
∗
ϑ . Finally, ϑ + 1 strictly prefers
aˆϑ+1 to a
∗
ϑ by the previous step in selecting aˆϑ+1, and strictly prefers aˆϑ+1 to aˆϑ+2
by the current step in selecting aˆϑ+2. Thus the sequence of type-specific individual
allocations {a∗ϑ , aˆϑ+1, aˆϑ+2} constitutes a self-selective set for types ϑ, ϑ + 1 and
ϑ + 2.
With aˆϑ+2 as a new starting point and by iterating the above procedure Θ −
ϑ − 2 additional times, one picks a sequence of type-specific individual alloca-
tions {a∗ϑ , aˆϑ+1, . . . , aˆΘ } which satisfies properties (i), (ii) and (iii) of Lemma 2.
In particular, note that for any type η with rank ϑ < η ≤ Θ , we have that
‖a∗ϑ − aˆη‖ ≤ ‖a
∗
ϑ − aˆϑ+1‖ +
∑η−ϑ−1
k=1 ‖aˆϑ+k − aˆϑ+k+1‖ ≤ (η − ϑ)
ǫ
Θ−ϑ ≤ ǫ,
so property (iii) is verified (clearly, this property holds for a∗ϑ too).
It remains to define an appropriate ǫ such that property (iv) also holds. Define
δ(ϑ, η) = min{‖a∗ϑ − aη‖ | ∀ aη ∈ Iη(a
∗
η)} to be the minimum distance between a
∗
ϑ
and the indifference curve Iη(a
∗
η) of type η which passes through her first-best type-
specific individual allocation. Define δminϑ = min{δ(ϑ, η) | ∀ η , ϑ < η ≤ Θ} to be
the minimum distance between a∗ϑ and the indifference curves of all types with rank
higher than ϑ which pass through their respective first-best type-specific individual
allocations. Then for any ǫ < δminϑ property (iv) of Lemma 2 holds, because all the
type-specific individual allocations in Aˆ(a∗ϑ ) are at most distance ǫ away from a
∗
ϑ .
Therefore, they belong to
⋂Θ−ϑ
k=1 Lϑ+k(a
∗
ϑ+k), where Lϑ+k(a
∗
ϑ+k) is the lower contour
of type ϑ + k, k ≥ 1, that is associated with the first-best type-specific individual
allocation a∗ϑ+k .
Overall, the sequence of type-specific individual allocations {a∗ϑ , aˆϑ+1, . . . , aˆΘ }
that constitutes Aˆ(a∗ϑ ) is assumed to be constructed for some ǫ < δ
min
ϑ and hence
properties (i)-(iv) of Lemma 2 hold. ⊓⊔
The figure in the next page depicts the construction of a self-selective set that
satisfies the properties of Lemma 2 for the case where there are two goods and three
types, types 1, 2 and 3, with corresponding ranking, in the economy (Fig. 2).
Proof of transitivity of rule 2 on the complete ranking of types
Lemma 3 Suppose that types ϑ, η, and ζ , with corresponding type-specific individual
allocations a∗ϑ , a
∗
η, and a
∗
ζ , belong to the same envy set and suppose that: (i) uϑ (a
∗
ϑ ) >
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Fig. 2 A self-selective set for two goods and three types
uϑ (a
∗
η), uη(a
∗
ϑ ) = uη(a
∗
η), (i i)uη(a
∗
η) > uη(a
∗
ζ ), uζ (a
∗
η) = uζ (a
∗
ζ ). Then uϑ (a
∗
ϑ ) >
uϑ (a
∗
ζ ).
Proof We prove the result by case elimination. There are two other cases possible,
uϑ (a
∗
ϑ ) < uϑ (a
∗
ζ ) and uϑ (a
∗
ϑ ) = uϑ (a
∗
ζ ). We show that either of them is in contradic-
tion with the assumption of single-crossing of the utility functions and the assumptions
in the statement of Lemma 3.
(a) uϑ (a
∗
ϑ ) < uϑ (a
∗
ζ ): This case is impossible to occur because it violates the
assumption that all three types belong to the same envy set and therefore ϑ does not
envy ζ .
(b) uϑ (a
∗
ϑ ) = uϑ (a
∗
ζ ): This case contains two subcases, (i) uζ (a
∗
ϑ ) = uζ (a
∗
ζ ) and
(ii) uζ (a
∗
ϑ ) < uζ (a
∗
ζ ). The subcase uζ (a
∗
ϑ ) > uζ (a
∗
ζ ) is not examined for the same
reason as the case uϑ (a
∗
ϑ ) < uϑ (a
∗
ζ ).
(i) Suppose uζ (a
∗
ϑ ) = uζ (a
∗
ζ ). But in this case, we have that both types ϑ and ζ are
indifferent between their two first-best type-specific individual allocations a∗ϑ and a
∗
ζ ,
which violates the single-crossing assumption. Hence this case is impossible to hold.
(ii) Suppose uζ (a
∗
ϑ ) < uζ (a
∗
ζ ). By uη(a
∗
ϑ ) = uη(a
∗
η) and uϑ (a
∗
ϑ ) > uϑ (a
∗
η), we
have that a∗η ∈ Iη(a
∗
ϑ ) ∩ Lϑ (a
∗
ϑ ), where Iη(a
∗
ϑ ) is the indifference curve of type
η that passes though the type-specific individual allocation a∗ϑ and Lϑ (a
∗
ϑ ) is the
lower contour set of type ϑ associated with a∗ϑ . Similarly, by uϑ (a
∗
ϑ ) = uϑ (a
∗
ζ ) and
uη(a
∗
η) > uη(a
∗
ζ ), we have that a
∗
ζ ∈ Iϑ (a
∗
ϑ ) ∩ Lη(a
∗
η).
Therefore, by uζ (a
∗
η) = uζ (a
∗
ζ ), we have that Iζ (a
∗
ζ ) passes through two points, a
∗
η
which belongs in the set Iη(a
∗
ϑ ) ∩ Lϑ (a
∗
ϑ ), and a
∗
ζ which belongs to the set Iϑ (a
∗
ϑ ) ∩
Lη(a
∗
η). But any such indifference curve lies below a
∗
ϑ , which means that Iζ (a
∗
ζ ) ∈
Lζ (a
∗
ϑ ), which implies that uζ (a
∗
ϑ ) > uζ (a
∗
ζ ) (see figure 3 for an illustration of the
argument when L = 2). This violates the assumption that all three types belong to
the same envy set and hence this case is also impossible to hold. Therefore, it must be
that uϑ (a
∗
ϑ ) > uϑ (a
∗
ζ ). ⊓⊔
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Fig. 3 The argument in the proof of Lemma 3 for the case of two goods
The result of Lemma 3 means that rule 2 in page 10, which is used in creat-
ing the ranking of types, is transitive. This is because, whenever the conditions of
Lemma 3 apply to a triplet of types {ϑ, η, ζ }, then, as we proved uϑ (a
∗
ϑ ) > uϑ (a
∗
ζ ),
and uϑ (a
∗
ϑ ) > uϑ (a
∗
η). As a result, rule 2 gives higher ranking to type ϑ over η and ζ
and higher ranking to η over ζ . Thus, the ranking of types is consistent whenever the
rules of page 10 are applied.
Proof of Theorem 1
Because the set of type-specific individual allocations {a∗ϑ |ϑ ∈ Θ} and the correspond-
ing number of bundles which constitute a∗(ω) is independent of ω, the implementation
of an efficient allocation rule ρ∗(ω) = a∗(ω) is equivalent to inducing agents to report
their type truthfully and to receive the a∗ϑ that corresponds to their type. Thus, to prove
Theorem 1, it is sufficient to find a mechanism that induces agents to reveal their type
truthfully and which allocates to them the corresponding a∗ϑ . The proof is done by con-
struction. A sequential mechanism is presented and shown to generate this result. To
facilitate its presentation, the proof is broken into several steps, which are summarized
in Lemmas.
First, we reintroduce some notation used in the main text along with some new defi-
nitions, which are needed exclusively for the proof. Then, the mechanism is presented
in formal terms. Subsequently, we provide a series of results on the best-responses
of different types at different stages of the mechanism. Finally, these results are put
together to provide the final result.
The following list contains the notation and definitions used in the proof of the
results that follow:
– a∗(ω) is the first-best and anonymous allocation to be implemented for every
ω ∈ Ω(φ)
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– The sequence of natural numbers {1, 2, . . . , ϑ, . . . , Θ} represents the sequence of
types, which are ranked according to envy and by applying the rules of page 10.
Note that this sequence is invariant of ω
– After removing element Θ , the sequence {1, 2, . . . , ϑ, . . . , Θ−1} also represents
the stages of the mechanism. Thus, stage ϑ refers to the ϑ-th stage of the mecha-
nism, and the “target” type of the stage refers to type ϑ , the agents of which are
expected to reveal their type truthfully at this stage
– The sequence {a∗1, a
∗
2, . . . , a
∗
ϑ , . . . , a
∗
Θ} is the sequence of first-best type-
specific individual allocations which corresponds to the sequence of types
{1, 2, . . . , ϑ, . . . , Θ}. Note that this sequence is invariant of ω too
– The sequence { Aˆ(a∗1), Aˆ(a
∗
2), . . . , Aˆ(a
∗
ϑ ), . . . , Aˆ(a
∗
Θ)} is the sequence of self-
selective sets, which satisfy the properties of Lemma 2, and each one of them
contains type-specific individual allocations in an ǫ-neighborhood of the respective
first-best type-specific individual allocation
– aˆη(a
∗
ϑ ) denotes a generic element in the self-selective set Aˆ(a
∗
ϑ ), where η denotes
the type who prefers this type-specific individual allocation over all others in
the set, and a∗ϑ denotes the first-best type-specific individual allocation, in the
ǫ-neighborhood of which aˆη(a
∗
ϑ ) is located
– Let aη(ϑ) = {aˆη(a
∗
ζ ) | uη(aˆη(a
∗
ζ )) ≥ uη(aˆη(a
∗
ι )) , ∀ ι ∈ Θ, ι ≤ ϑ , ϑ ≤ η}
be the self-selective type-specific individual allocation which type η prefers over
all other in the sequence of self-selective sets up to stage ϑ of the mechanism. If
more than one type-specific individual allocations satisfy this definition, then let
aη(ϑ) be an arbitrary one among them
– Finally, recall the following definitions from Sect. 3.6. miϑ denotes the “message”
or “report” that agent i sends to the mechanism designer at stage ϑ of the mecha-
nism. μ(ϑ) = {#i |μiϑ = ϑ, i ∈ N } is the total number of agents who report type
ϑ . N (ϑ) is the total number of agents in the economy with type ϑ , which is com-
mon knowledge since N (ϑ) = φ(ϑ)N . Jϑ is the set of agent who participate at
stage ϑ . giϑ (miϑ ,m−i,ϑ ) is the type-specific individual allocation that the mech-
anism specifies to agent i as a function of the message profile mϑ = {miϑ ,m−i,ϑ }
if i exits the mechanism at stage ϑ .
Lemma 4 The following results are direct implications of the definition of aη(ϑ)
(i) uη(aη(ϑ)) > uη(aˆζ (a
∗
ι )) , ∀ aˆζ (a
∗
ι ) ∈ Aˆ(a
∗
ι ) , ∀ ζ = η, ∀ ι ≤ ϑ
(ii) aη(η) = a
∗
η
(iii) uη(aη(ϑ)) > uη(aζ (ϑ)), ∀ {ζ, η} ∈ Θ , ζ ≥ ϑ , η ≥ ϑ , ζ = η
(iv) uη(aη(ζ )) ≥ uη(aη(ϑ)), ∀ ζ > ϑ
Proof (i) uη(aˆη(a
∗
ι )) > uη(aˆζ (a
∗
ι )), ∀ ζ = η, ∀ ι ≤ ϑ , by property (ii) of Lemma 2.
Moreover, uη(aη(ϑ)) ≥ uη(aˆη(a
∗
ι )), ∀ ι ≤ ϑ , by the definition of aη(ϑ). These two
inequalities together imply the result.
(ii) By the design of the self-selective set Aˆ(a∗η), a
∗
η is the most preferable type-
specific individual allocation for typeη among all other elements in this set. In addition,
for ϑ < η, property (iv) of Lemma 2 and the definition of aˆη(a
∗
ϑ ) mean that a
∗
η is
strictly preferred to any other element of any self-selective set Aˆ(a∗ϑ ). These two facts
together imply the result.
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(iii) By construction, aζ (ϑ) is one of the type-specific individual allocations in
the sequence {aˆζ (a
∗
1), aˆζ (a
∗
2), . . . , aˆζ (a
∗
ϑ )}. Suppose it is the ι-th element in this
sequence, with 1 ≤ ι ≤ ϑ . Then, by property (ii) of Lemma 2 and the definition of
aη(ϑ), we have that, uη(aζ (ϑ)) = uη(aˆζ (a
∗
ι )) < uη(aˆη(a
∗
ι )) ≤ uη(aη(ϑ)).
(iv) aη(ϑ) = argmax{uη(aι) | aι ∈ {aˆη(a
∗
1), aˆη(a
∗
2), . . . , aˆη(a
∗
ϑ )} }
aη(ζ ) = argmax{uη(aι) | aι ∈ {aˆη(a
∗
1), aˆη(a
∗
2), . . . , aˆη(a
∗
ζ )} }
{aˆη(a
∗
1), aˆη(a
∗
2), . . . , aˆη(a
∗
ϑ )} ⊆ {aˆη(a
∗
1), aˆη(a
∗
2), . . . , aˆη(a
∗
ζ )}
therefore uη(aη(ζ )) ≥ uη(aη(ϑ)). ⊓⊔
The mechanism M∗ We denote the mechanism by M∗ to separate it from all other
possible mechanisms. It consists of Θ − 1 stages. In each stage ϑ , 1 ≤ ϑ ≤ Θ − 1
each agent i who participates in the stage sends a report miϑ ∈ {ϑ, ϑ + 1, . . . , Θ}.
That is, the strategy space of each agent is a report of a type at least as large in terms
of ranking as the stage of the mechanism.
At an arbitrary stage ϑ , 1 ≤ ϑ ≤ Θ − 2, if μ(ϑ) = N (ϑ) , then agents
with miϑ = ϑ receive the first-best type-specific individual allocation a
∗
ϑ and exit the
mechanism that is they consume a∗ϑ immediately and they do not play in the remaining
stages of the mechanism. The remaining agents, that is agents with miϑ = ϑ , move to
stage ϑ + 1 of the mechanism. If μ(ϑ) = N (ϑ), then the mechanism ends at stage ϑ
and each agent with miϑ = η, ϑ ≤ η ≤ Θ , receives and consumes the type-specific
individual allocation aη(ϑ).
If the mechanism reaches stage Θ − 1, the last stage possible, then, if μ(Θ − 1) =
N (Θ − 1) agents with mi,Θ−1 = Θ − 1 receive and consume type-specific individual
allocation a∗Θ−1, agents with mi,Θ−1 = Θ receive and consume type-specific individ-
ual allocation a∗Θ , and the mechanism ends. If μ(Θ − 1) = N (Θ − 1), then agents
with mi,Θ−1 = Θ − 1 receive and consume type-specific individual allocation a
∗
Θ−1,
agents with mi,Θ−1 = Θ receive and consume type-specific individual allocation
aΘ(Θ − 1), and the mechanism ends. Formally, we have the following description of
the mechanism M∗.
– For all ϑ such that 1 ≤ ϑ ≤ Θ − 2:
– Ifμ(ϑ) = N (ϑ), then for all i ∈ {miϑ = ϑ} : giϑ (ϑ,m−i,ϑ ) = a
∗
ϑ , i /∈ Jϑ+1
, and for all i ∈ {miϑ = η = ϑ} : giϑ (η,m−i,ϑ ) = ∅ , i ∈ Jϑ+1
– If μ(ϑ) = N (ϑ), then for all i ∈ {miϑ = η} : giϑ (η,m−i,ϑ ) = aη(ϑ), for all
η ∈ {ϑ, ϑ + 1, . . . , Θ}, and Jϑ+1 = ∅,
– For ϑ = Θ − 1:
– If μ(Θ − 1) = N (Θ − 1), then for all i ∈ {mi,Θ−1 = Θ − 1} : gi,Θ−1(Θ −
1,m−i,Θ−1) = a
∗
Θ−1 , for all i ∈ {mi,Θ−1 = Θ} : gi,Θ−1(Θ,m−i,Θ−1) =
a
∗
Θ , and JΘ = ∅
– Ifμ(Θ−1) = N (Θ−1), then for all i ∈ {mi,Θ−1 = η} : gi,Θ−1(η,m−i,Θ−1)
= aη(Θ − 1), for all η ∈ {Θ − 1,Θ}, and JΘ = ∅
Lemma 5 Under M∗, at any stage ϑ, 1 ≤ ϑ ≤ Θ − 1, it is a strictly dominated
strategy for any agent of type η, with η > ϑ , to report type ϑ .
Proof Consider a generic stage ϑ, 1 ≤ ϑ ≤ Θ − 1, and an agent i with a generic
type η, ϑ < η ≤ Θ . We show that the strategy miϑ = ϑ is strictly dominated by the
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strategy miϑ = η, which is the truth-telling strategy, irrespective of i’s beliefs whether
the mechanism ends in stage ϑ or not.
In terms of how i’s strategy affects the probability that the mechanism terminates
at stage ϑ , there are three cases to consider. These three cases correspond to all the
possible ways that the other agents’ messages affect i’s payoff.
(a) When all other agents reports, excluding i’s report, are such μ(ϑ) = N (ϑ)
(b) When all other agents reports, excluding i’s report, are such μ(ϑ) ≥ N (ϑ)+ 1
or μ(ϑ) < N (ϑ)− 1
(c) When all other agents reports, excluding i’s report, are such μ(ϑ) = N (ϑ)− 1
(a) In this case i believes that the reports of the remaining agents are such that the
number of agents who report type ϑ is exactly equal to the number of agents with
type ϑ , given by the realized distribution of types φ. i is pivotal for the outcome of the
mechanism in this case. If i reports type ϑ , then she increases μ(ϑ) by one, so that,
after including i’s report,μ(ϑ) = N (ϑ)+1 = N (ϑ), which induces the mechanism to
end at stage ϑ . If, on the other hand, i reports truthfully her type η, then μ(ϑ) remains
unchanged after including her report. The mechanism proceeds to stage ϑ + 1, and i
along with it, since only agents with strategies m jϑ = ϑ, j = i , exit the mechanism
at stage ϑ .
From the above two outcomes, i strictly prefers the second, which corresponds to
the strategy miϑ = η, over the first, which corresponds to the strategy miϑ = ϑ .
To reach this conclusion, we first note that if i plays miϑ = ϑ , then the mechanism
terminates at stage ϑ and, by its rules, i receives and consumes aϑ (ϑ), which is equal
to a∗ϑ by Lemma 4(ii). If, on the other hand, i plays miϑ = η, her continuation payoff
is at least as large uη(aη(ϑ)). The last argument is true because, by Lemma 4(iv),
uη(aη(ζ )) ≥ uη(aη(ϑ)), ∀ ζ > ϑ . Finally, because uη(aη(ϑ)) > uη(aϑ (ϑ)) =
uη(a
∗
ϑ ) by Lemma 4(iii), reporting truthfully and proceeding to stage ϑ + 1 is strictly
preferable to i than terminating the mechanism at stage ϑ .
(b) In the second case i believes that the reports of the remaining agents are such that
the number of agents who report type ϑ does not equal the number of agents with
type ϑ , irrespective of her own report. That is, i expects that μ(ϑ) = N (ϑ) for all her
strategies miϑ , and, therefore, she believes that the mechanism terminates at stage ϑ
and she cannot affect this outcome. Under this belief, i expects to receive and consume
aη(ϑ) if she reports η and she expects to receive and consume aϑ (ϑ) if she reports ϑ .
By Lemma 4, uη(aη(ϑ)) > uη(aϑ (ϑ)) = uη(a
∗
ϑ ), and therefore, i strictly prefers to
report truthfully than to report type ϑ .
(c) In the last case i believes that the reports of the remaining agents are such that the
number of agents who report type ϑ does not equal the number of agents with type
ϑ by only one. If i reports ϑ , then, including her report, μ(ϑ) = N (ϑ) and so the
mechanism does not terminate at stage ϑ . If i reports η, then μ(ϑ) = N (ϑ) and the
mechanism terminates at stage ϑ . Therefore i’s report is pivotal in determining the
outcome of the mechanism for the other agents. For i , however, the comparison of
payoffs is the same as in case (b). If i reports ϑ , then she receives and consumes a∗ϑ and
exits the mechanism. If, on the other hand, she reports η the mechanism terminates at
stage ϑ and she receives and consumes aη(ϑ). As in case (b), uη(aη(ϑ)) > uη(a
∗
ϑ ),
by Lemma 4, and therefore i strictly prefers to report truthfully.
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Overall, under all possible beliefs regarding the outcomes of the mechanism, i strictly
prefers reporting her type truthfully over reporting type ϑ , and, therefore, the last
strategy is strictly dominated for her and will never be played in any equilibrium of
the mechanism. ⊓⊔
Lemma 6 If stage ϑ of M∗ is reached, ϑ > 1, then all agents with types of rank lower
than type ϑ have exited the mechanism at previous stages, and all agents with types
of rank equal or higher than ϑ participate in stage ϑ .
Proof The proof is done by induction. Consider stage 1 of M∗. By the design of M∗,
moving from stage 1 to stage 2 happens only if μ(1) = N (1). Since, by Lemma 5,
all agent with types {2, 3, . . . Θ} do not report type 1 at stage 1, the requirement for
proceeding to stage 2 is met only if all agents with type 1 report their type truthfully
and exit the mechanism at stage 1. Therefore, if stage 2 is reached, all the agents of
type 2 or higher participate, but no agent of type 1 participates.
Similarly, stage 3 is reached only if μ(2) = N (2) at stage 2. By Lemma 5, no agent
of type 3 or of higher type reports type 2 so stage 3 is reached only if all agents of type
2 report their type truthfully. Thus, if stage 3 is reached, then all agents of type 2 have
exited at stage 2 and all agents of type 3 or higher participate in stage 3. By applying
the same reasoning to each successive stage, the result obtains. ⊓⊔
Lemma 7 Under M∗, the unique best-response of any agent with type ϑ when she
participates in stage ϑ is to report her type truthfully.
Proof By Lemma 6, in stage ϑ participate all agents of type ϑ or higher and no agent
of rank lower than ϑ . By Lemma 5, all agents of type ϑ+1 or higher do not report type
ϑ . Therefore, for an agent i of type ϑ there are two distinct sets of beliefs consistent
with the equilibrium behavior of other types.
(a) When all other agents of type ϑ report truthfully
(b) When one or more agents of type ϑ do not report truthfully
(a) In this case, excluding i’s report, μ(ϑ) = N (ϑ) − 1. If i reports miϑ = ϑ ,
then, after including her report, μ(ϑ) increases by one so that μ(ϑ) = N (ϑ), the
mechanism proceeds to stage ϑ + 1 if ϑ < Θ − 1 or terminates if ϑ = Θ − 1, and i
receives and consumes a∗ϑ . If i reports miϑ = η = ϑ , then, after including her report,
μ(ϑ) < N (ϑ), the mechanism terminates at stage ϑ , and i receives and consumes
aη(ϑ). By Lemma 4, uϑ (a
∗
ϑ ) = uϑ (aϑ (ϑ)) > uϑ (aη(ϑ), therefore, i strictly prefers
to report truthfully than to report any other type.
(b) In this case, excluding i’s report, μ(ϑ) ≤ N (ϑ) − 2, and, therefore, irrespective
of i’s report, the mechanism terminates at stage ϑ . If i reports miϑ = ϑ she receives
and consumes aϑ (ϑ) = a
∗
ϑ and if she reports miϑ = η = ϑ , then she receives and
consumes aη(ϑ). As with case (a) above, uϑ (aϑ (ϑ)) > uϑ (aη(ϑ), and, therefore, i
strictly prefers to report truthfully than to report any other type.
Overall, under any set of beliefs regarding the possible strategies of the other agents
with type ϑ, i strictly prefers to report truthfully than report any other type and the
result of the Lemma obtains. ⊓⊔
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Together, the construction of M∗ along with the results of Lemmas 5, 6 and 7, implies
the result of Theorem 1 in page 12. To be precise, at any stage ϑ of M∗, 1 ≤ ϑ ≤
Θ − 1, agents of type with rank higher than ϑ do not report type ϑ , by Lemma 5,
agents of type with rank lower than ϑ have exited the mechanism at earlier stages, by
Lemma 6, and the unique best-response of agents with type ϑ is to report their type
truthfully, receive a∗ϑ and exit the mechanism, by Lemma 7.
The result of Lemma 7 also implies that, sinceμ(ϑ) = N (ϑ), 1 ≤ ϑ ≤ Θ−1, on the
equilibrium path, all stages of the mechanism are reached. Moreover, since Lemmas 5
and 7 apply to the last stage as well, stage Θ − 1, then μ(Θ − 1) = N (Θ − 1).
Therefore, by the design of M∗, all agents of type Θ − 1 receive and consume a∗Θ−1,
all agents of type Θ receive and consume a∗Θ and the mechanism terminates. Thus,
the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome of M∗ is for all agents to report
their type truthfully and to receive the first-best type-specific individual allocation
corresponding to their type, as Theorem 1 requires. ⊓⊔
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